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2.1 Introduction
‘The restorative justice movement originally began as an 
effort to rethink the needs which crimes create, as well as the 
roles implicit in crimes’, Howard Zehr, one of the pioneers of 
the movement, writes in his Little Book of Restorative Justice.11 
Throughout the last four or five decades, the proponents of 
restorative justice have questioned the most fundamental 
aspects of the way we sanction crime: how should we react to 
crime? What is the aim of our sanctioning system? What are 
the needs of the parties involved and how can they be met? The 
answers given have been radically different from the traditional 
answers of the criminal law. An alternative to the criminal pro-
cess has been born.
This alternative is, however, not a specifi c kind of process called 
restorative justice. Victim–offender mediation, family group con-
ferencing, community circles, sentencing circles – these are just a 
few of the types of processes that are called restorative.12 As Lord 
Justice Auld remarks in his Review of the Criminal Courts of England 
11 Howard Zehr, The Little Book of Restorative Justice (Intercourse, pa: Good Books, 
2002), p. 13.
12 E.g. Shari Tickell and Kate Akester, Restorative Justice: The Way Ahead (London: 
Justice, 2004), p. 21.
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and Wales, restorative justice has been described as ‘more of a phi-
losophy than a specifi c model’.13
The philosophy that unites these different models – to the extent 
that there can be said to be one philosophy of restorative justice: 
the debate about the defi nition of restorative justice continues14 
– gives an answer to the question of what the aims of our sanction-
ing system ought to be. It is the content of these aims that I shall 
explore in the following. I shall do so by comparing the aims of 
restorative justice with the aims of the criminal law as they are tra-
ditionally conceived, thereby attempting to show that restorative 
justice is based on a different conception of justice from that of 
the criminal law, in other words, a different understanding of how 
individual confl icts ought to be solved, both with regard to who 
should decide the outcome, and what a just outcome may be like. I 
shall also discuss whether restorative justice can be said to fulfi l the 
functional purpose of criminal law in a modern society, especially 
with regard to general deterrence.
The application of restorative justice processes within the 
criminal justice system is in continuous growth.15 Many countries 
plan to expand the use of restorative justice in the coming years. 
One example is Norway, where restorative justice is already incor-
porated into the criminal justice system through the Norwegian 
Mediation Service (Konfl iktrådet). A government rapport from 
2007 states:
The Justice Department believes that restorative justice should have a 
central place in the future way of reacting to crime (…) For crimes that 
have been admitted and where there is a known victim, a process of 
dialogue and restoration and reconciliation should always be attempted. 
Such an approach may be viable on all levels and at all times after the 
crime is committed.16
13 Lord Justice Auld, Review of the Criminal Courts of England and Wales (London: 
Stationery Offi ce Books, 2001), p. 387. The review was commissioned by the 
Lord Chancellor, the Home Secretary and the Attorney-General in December 
1999.
14 E.g. Howard Zehr and Barb Toews, Critical Issues in Restorative Justice (Monsey, 
ny: Criminal Justice Press, 2004), pp. 1–60.
15 See, generally, Tickell and Akester, Restorative Justice.
16 St.meld. 37 (2007–2008) Straff som virker [‘Punishment That Works’] – mindre 
kriminalitet – tryggere samfunn (Kriminalomsorgsmelding), section 12.3.4. In the 
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In other words: the Justice Department foresees a considerable 
increase in the use of restorative justice; it desires an even greater 
integration of restorative justice into the criminal justice system 
than we have today.17
A question then arises: is it possible to integrate restorative 
justice into the criminal justice system to the extent that the Justice 
Department plans? Can the two types of processes be reconciled in 
a way that makes it possible for them to co-exist as two alternative 
procedures competing for criminal cases? Or do they have such 
fundamentally different aims that they cannot co-exist without 
constantly undermining each other? Will for instance the ‘case spe-
cifi c’ or singular nature of restorative justice processes undermine 
the rule-of-law principles that constitute the normative basis of 
the criminal process, such as the principle of legality, the principle 
of equality before the law and the principle of proportionality 
between offence and sanction?
A closely related, and more practical, question is how it might 
be possible to organise the integration of restorative justice into 
the criminal justice system in a way that respects the nature of the 
two processes, if that is at all possible. For instance, how far can 
we go in establishing court supervision and control of restorative 
justice agreements before the autonomy of the mediating parties 
is jeopardised? And from a criminal justice point of view: how 
much autonomy is it acceptable to leave to the parties before the 
process becomes merely a private and not a legal justice process? 
These and similar questions about the practical integration of 
restorative justice in the criminal justice system will not, however, 
be addressed in this paper. The aim here is to clarify some of the 
philosophical principles that distinguish restorative justice from 
criminal justice.
original Norwegian text the wording is: ‘Departementet mener at tilbud om 
restorative justice bør ha en sentral plass i framtidens måte å reagere på lov-
brudd på. (…)Ved tilstått lovbrudd med identifi serbart offer skal det alltid om 
mulig legges opp til dialog med gjenoppretting og forsoning som mål. En slik 
tilnærming kan være aktuelt på alle nivåer og på alle tidspunkter etter at lov-
bruddet er blitt begått.’
17 The police or prosecutor may today divert criminal cases to the Norwegian 
Mediation Service when the cases are deemed suitable for mediation 
(Straffeprosessloven §71a), typically cases of rather minor crime, and not, for 
instance, serious violent crime.
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The life of the law is not always conducted strictly in accordance 
with one set of overarching principles. Rules, institutions and 
sanctions that are based on different theoretical viewpoints may 
be adapted into the legal system in modifi ed versions and as such 
co-exist quite well. Accordingly, from a traditional pragmatist or 
functionalist point of view, the co-existence of restorative justice 
ideas and traditional criminal law ideas in the same criminal justice 
system may very well be unproblematic. The uncertainty regard-
ing the possibility of reconciling the philosophical foundations of 
restorative justice with the rule of law principles of the criminal 
justice system does not necessarily mean that the two processes are 
irreconcilable in practice. Nevertheless, the practical integration of 
restorative justice into the criminal justice system would be well 
served by a philosophical and principled discussion on the nature 
and the aims of restorative justice and the criminal justice system. 
It is through such a discussion that we shall become best equipped 
to judge whether the attempts to integrate restorative justice into 
the criminal justice system preserve the necessary characteristics of 
a restorative justice process, or whether the result is an integrated 
process that ceases to be restorative.
2.2 The general aims of sanctioning crime
On a very general level restorative justice and the criminal justice 
process share the same aims. They are both ways of sanctioning 
wrongful behaviour. The purpose of this sanctioning is twofold: 
on the one hand there is what we might call the societal function 
of the sanctioning system, where the aim is to deal with wrongful 
actions in a way that minimises the confl ict level in the society as a 
whole – in other words, to somehow prevent as much wrongdoing 
in society as possible. On the other hand there is what we might 
call the individual function of the sanctioning system, where the 
aim is to deal with each specifi c confl ict in a way that somehow 
resolves the confl ict and restores a sense of justice among the par-
ties. Naturally, these two aspects are not completely independent 
of each other: individual cases are not solved in a vacuum, but 
depend on the institutions and norms of the legal system and the 
established concepts of justice in society. Likewise, the societal 
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function is dependent on individual cases being solved satisfac-
torily – the legitimacy and effi cacy of the legal system rest on the 
confi dence people place in it for solving their confl icts. In addition, 
individual cases may serve as examples, producing a deterrent effect 
and thereby infl uencing the confl ict level of society directly.18
Though the two processes in question share these very general 
aims, each process is based on an understanding of the content of 
these aims and how they should be reached that is sometimes fun-
damentally different from the other. They do not, in other words, 
share the same normative basis on some key issues. I shall in the 
following point out some of these differences both on the societal 
level and on the individual level.
2.3 The societal function of sanctioning crime
2.3.1 Restorative justice and the community
There is considerable doubt whether restorative justice can fulfi l 
the functional purpose of the criminal law in a complex modern 
society. Restorative justice is often considered a kind of private 
confl ict resolution that is primarily relevant to the immediate 
parties of the confl ict. In Nils Christie’s seminal article Confl icts as 
Property, the criminal process is famously portrayed as ‘stealing’ the 
confl ict from the involved parties.19 In contrast, restorative justice 
is seen as a way of ensuring the parties’ ownership of their confl ict. 
The state is often excluded from the process, sometimes attrib-
uted only the role of mediator, as in the county-level Norwegian 
Mediation Service (Konfl iktrådet). This kind of privatisation of 
the confl ict resolution, awarding the parties greater autonomy in 
the decision-making, can be seen as being at the heart and soul of 
18 In criminal law science, the aims of the criminal law are most commonly divided 
between general deterrence and retribution. Both these aims will be treated in 
the paper. I have, however, chosen to lead the following discussion along the line 
of the societal and the individual function of the sanctioning system, as these are 
more general terms that are relevant to both types of process in question.
19 Nils Christie, ‘Confl icts as Property’, The British Journal of Criminology, 17 (1) 
1977, pp. 1–15.
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restorative justice.20 It would, however, be wrong to conclude from 
this that restorative justice is a private matter and does not include 
a broader societal perspective. The societal function of the confl ict 
resolution process is important in many restorative justice theories, 
although society is usually considered on a smaller scale, as the 
community of the parties.
John Braithwaite is one of many restorative justice theorists who 
underline the importance of the community in assuring that the agree-
ment reached by the parties is fulfi lled. His widely discussed theory 
of reintegrative shaming is a good example of a theory of the purpose 
of restorative justice that stresses the societal aspect. The restorative 
justice process, he claims, involves a form of shaming of the offender 
by the community, and this may have a positive effect when followed 
by a reintegration of the offender into the community.21
RA Duff too stresses the communicative aspect of restorative 
justice: The characteristic feature of mediation in criminal cases, he 
claims, is the moral censure that is communicated to the offender 
for his crime. Mediation in civil cases, on the other hand, does 
not necessarily involve moral censure or shaming (for instance 
in a case of two neighbours arguing over water supply). Criminal 
mediation, like the criminal process, addresses a wrong that has 
been committed and thus serves the societal purpose of censuring 
wrongful acts.22
Some more radical forms of restorative justice, such as the tra-
ditional Native American versions, put an even larger emphasis on 
the role of the community, not just in the resolution of the confl ict, 
but also in the reason for the emergence of the confl ict. In this kind 
of relationship-oriented form of restorative justice, the offender 
does not bear the entire responsibility for the offence. The relation-
ships between the offender, the victim and their community must 
20 Howard Zehr views the participation of the primary parties in the justice pro-
cess as one of the ‘three pillars of restorative justice’. The other two pillars are 
(1) the focus on repairing the harm done to the victims and meeting the needs 
of all parties, and (2) the focus on the offender’s obligation toward the victim 
to repair the harm, The Little Book of Restorative Justice, pp. 22–26.
21 John Braithwaite, Crime, Shame and Reintegration (Cambridge University Press, 
1989).
22 RA Duff, Restoration and Retribution, in A. von Hirsch, A. Ashworth & J. 
Roberts, Principled Sentencing: Readings on Theory and Policy (Hart, Oxford: 
2009), pp. 178–188.
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also be taken into account. One could describe it as a form of col-
lective responsibility for not preventing the confl ict, as well as for 
the resolution of the confl ict, yet without denying that the offender 
has a personal responsibility as well.23
Some modern restorative justice theorists, like Howard Zehr, 
express a similar attitude about the collective responsibility of the 
community:
The community bears a responsibility for the welfare of its members and 
the social conditions and relationships which promote both crime and 
community peace. The community has responsibilities to support efforts 
to integrate offenders into the community, to be actively involved in the 
defi nitions of offender obligations and to ensure opportunities for offend-
ers to make amends.24
2.3.2 General deterrence
The main inadequacy of restorative justice with regard to the 
societal function of the legal system is the lack of a general deter-
rence perspective. The outcomes of restorative justice processes 
can hardly be said to constitute a clear threat of negative sanctions 
for someone contemplating a crime, mainly because the outcomes 
are not decided in advance and may vary from relatively extensive 
restitution schemes to no consequences at all apart from the restor-
ative justice meeting. Hence, it may be claimed that restorative 
justice does not offer the necessary predictability of sanctions for 
it to fulfi l the deterrent function of the legal system. In addition, 
the burden of the sanction agreed upon in the restorative justice 
meeting is often considered to be much lighter than the sanction 
would have been in a criminal court. Therefore, in the presumed 
cost–benefi t analysis of potential criminals, a threat of restorative 
justice would weigh less than the threat of punishment, and would 
presumably lead to more crimes being committed. 
23 For more on the Native American type of restorative justice, see, for example, 
Rupert Ross, (Toronto: Penguin Canada, 1996), and David C. Vogt, Det 
kalkulerende individ: straffesystemets fi losofi ske forutsetning (University of Bergen, 
Master’s thesis, 2006, pp. 80–89).
24 Zehr, The Little Book of Restorative Justice, p. 66.
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However, this idealised rational agent model of general deterrence 
may be criticised. Empirical research shows that the main deter-
rent effect comes from the fear of being caught, not from the fear 
of the punishment itself.25 The greatest fear is of being exposed as 
the person who committed such an awful act, of being stigmatised 
as a criminal, of facing the public humiliation of a trial. There is no 
reason why a restorative justice process cannot be equally frighten-
ing, granted the process is public, or at least involves the people the 
offender cares about.26 Restorative justice may therefore be able to 
achieve this main deterrent effect.
But, even though the deterrent effect of fearing exposure is 
more important than the effect of the threat of punishment, 
that does not mean that the latter is unimportant, especially 
facing criminals of the tough sort, who are presumed to be 
immune to the kind of primary control that restorative justice 
represents. Some would call it naïve to think that the threat of 
mediation might deter these habitual criminals. Law professor 
Johs. Andenæs seems to be of that opinion. He writes in the 
book Straffen som problem (‘The Problem of Punishment’) that an 
accountant, a priest, a teacher, a public servant – in other words 
what we may call ‘normal law-abiding citizens’ – would rather 
fear exposure than punishment, when contemplating a crime. 
But then he goes on to write: ‘For a previously punished habitual 
criminal, or an unemployed youth from a drug-user environment, 
this would be different’.27
Perhaps there is something to this argument: people who 
already feel alienated from society will not be deterred by the risk 
of exposure and further alienation. Studies of the criminal group 
of society show that unmarried men, between 18 and 24 years old, 
living in cities, with weak ties to family, school, housing and work 
are over-represented in the criminal statistics. The characteristic 
trait that unites this group, according to Braithwaite, is weaker 
than normal social ties to the community.28
25 See Jørn Jacobsen, ‘Diskusjonen om allmennprevensjonen sin faktiske verknad’, 
Tidsskrift for strafferett, 4 (2004), pp. 414–17, for an overview of research on the 
deterrent effect of punishment.
26 Cf. Braithwaite, Crime, Shame and Reintegration.
27 Johs. Andenæs, Straffen som problem (Halden: Exil, 1994), pp. 53–54.
28 Braithwaite, Crime, Shame and Reintegration, pp. 44–48.
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The conclusion that Andenæs draws – that punishment is neces-
sary because primary control is ineffi cient for this group – is none 
the less questionable. It is questionable both from a moral perspec-
tive – he admits that punishment is primarily aimed at some of the 
least privileged people in society – and logically – he claims that 
punishment is a necessary deterrent for those people who happen 
to be the main recipients of punishment. It is a logical fallacy to 
claim the people who are in fact punished as examples of people 
for whom the threat of punishment functions as a deterrent – obvi-
ously the threat of punishment did not deter these people, since 
they committed the crimes and were punished. This is not to say 
that punishment can never deter this group, but merely that it, 
unlike the law-abiding group of society, cannot be used in an argu-
ment for the deterrent effect of punishment.
Perhaps the conclusion should be that neither the fear of expo-
sure, nor the threat of punishment is enough to deter the most 
diehard criminals, in which case the restorative justice approach 
of appealing to the conscience of the offender, for instance by 
confronting him or her with the victim’s suffering, might prove 
to be a more productive approach. Put differently: if weak social 
ties are acknowledged as a common factor increasing the risk of 
criminal behaviour, then it would not be unreasonable to think that 
a sanction that attempts to address this problem might succeed 
better than a sanction that further excludes the offender from the 
community.
Either way, it is a plain fact that restorative justice cannot satisfy 
the aim of deterring presumed cost–benefi t calculating and socially 
alienated criminals, such as members of the mafi a, by posing a 
threat of severely disadvantageous sanctions. This, I suspect, is 
one of the main reasons why it is considered unrealistic to think 
that restorative justice can ever replace the criminal process as 
the main sanctioning process in modern society. Other functional 
obligations of the legal system, beyond that of general deterrence, 
further underline this conclusion: the need for an effi cient and 
predictable system where security seems to be an ever more impor-
tant goal, where the scope of a crime may go way beyond the local 
and morally more comprehensible crimes of less complex societies, 
and where the interests that demand protection may be economic, 
communal or may concern a person on the other side of the globe. 
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The societal function of the legal system in a global world cannot 
be achieved solely by a mediation system that was conceived under 
considerably less complex circumstances.
That does not mean that restorative justice has no part to play in 
a modern society. It is certainly possible to imagine restorative pro-
cesses alongside the criminal process, even to a larger degree than 
we see in, for example, Norway today. Perhaps the societal function 
is suffi ciently well maintained by the criminal process, so that even 
a considerable element of restorative justice in the criminal justice 
system may still be compatible with it. When it comes to the goal of 
general deterrence, which is mainly achieved through fear of expo-
sure, there certainly seems to be a large degree of fl exibility in the 
choice of sanction, at least as long as the possibility of punishment 
remains as a distant threat.29
2.3.3 Ensuring the state’s monopoly of force
Another societal function of the sanctioning system is maintained 
by the state’s ability to provide a response to wrongful behaviour 
that prevents the public from taking the sanctioning into own 
hands. This aim of preventing revenge is perhaps the oldest way of 
justifying the public penal system. The parties involved, as well as 
the public at large, must feel that justice is being done if they are 
to accept that the state has a monopoly on enforcing sanctions. 
Hence, the criminal justice system must not just accomplish the 
aim of crime prevention; it must also meet a demand for justice.
Is restorative justice capable of meeting such a demand? The 
seemingly insatiable appetite for harsher punishment expressed in 
29 The question of whether restorative justice can take part in a criminal justice 
system without weakening its deterrent function naturally invokes a more 
fundamental question regarding the extent to which general deterrence should 
infl uence the design of the criminal justice system in general. Some, like 
Nils Jareborg in Straffrättsideologiska fragment (Uppsala: Iustus Förlag, 1992), 
pp. 136–48, argue that general deterrence is a relevant concern only with regard 
to criminalisation: and its function in terms of crime prevention, and deny 
its role in sentencing and execution of the sanction. From such a perspective, 
restorative justice elements in the process and sentencing would presumably be 
regarded as unproblematic under such a theory, as long as the criminalisation 
and threat of punishment is upheld. This is not to suggest that Jareborg and 
others may not fi nd restorative justice problematic for other reasons than gen-
eral deterrence.
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the media and by most political parties seems to suggest that it may 
be diffi cult. It is easy to get the impression that punishing criminals 
is an essential part of people’s sense of justice: no punishment, no 
justice.
However, as research has shown, the matter is more compli-
cated. The large survey performed by Flemming Balvig in 2006, 
Danskernes syn på straff (‘The Danish View on Punishment’)30 
suggests that people’s view on the justice of punishment greatly 
depends on the way the question is asked. When asked a general 
question of their view of punishment, a great majority claimed 
to be in favour of harsher sentences. But when asked what they 
considered to be right in a specifi c case, they were a lot less puni-
tive, and generally less so than the Danish courts. And after being 
shown a video of a simulated trial, most became even milder in 
their judgements.31
How should we interpret these results? Either people’s opinions 
are generally not well informed and they therefore change their 
opinion when more information is given (on a specifi c case) – this 
suggests that people are in reality less punitive than one might get 
the impression of from simple surveys and tv talk shows – or it 
means that the very concept of justice is such that it evades a clear 
defi nition that can yield universal answers to what is just. A third 
possibility is that both of these interpretations may be right.
2.4 Resolving individual cases
We are now already deep into the question of what I have called 
the individual function of the sanctioning system: dealing with 
each case in a way that resolves the confl ict and restores a sense of 
justice. I shall now look more closely at how the two processes in 
30 Flemming Balvig, Danskernes syn på straff (Copenhagen: Advokatsamfundet, 2006).
31 In 2009, Flemming Balvig, Helgi Gunnlaugsson, Kristina Jerre, Leif Petter 
Olaussen and Henrik Tham conducted a follow-up survey in all the Nordic 
countries that has largely corroborated the fi ndings of Balvig’s 2006 study 
(the Finnish results have not yet been analysed), see Balvig, Gunnlaugsson, 
Jerre, Olaussen and Tham, ‘Attitudes towards Punishment in the Nordic 
Countries’, Nordisk Tidsskrift for Kriminalvidenskap, 97 (3) (2010). Similar results 
were also found by Thomas Mathiesen, Tiltak mot ungdomskriminalitet (Oslo: 
Universitetsforlaget, 1965).
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question attempt to fulfi l this function and then return to the issue 
of how we should interpret Balvig’s survey and the possibility for 
restorative justice to satisfy our demand for justice.
Even passionate utilitarians will concede that the criminal pro-
cess must aim at creating a just solution to each case. It might not 
be the primary aim – general deterrence or treatment of offenders 
might be considered more important – but as Johs. Andenæs32 
and John Rawls,33 among others, have stressed: punishment must 
always be deserved by the offender. It would be wrong to consider 
only the utility of punishing somebody; it would inevitably lead 
to the acceptance of punishing innocent people or bestowing dra-
conian sentences when the consequences are for the greater good. 
Punishment must be just, which means that the offender, to use the 
term of Immanuel Kant, must be ‘strafbar’ (‘punishable’).
The way Kant explains it, a person makes himself ‘strafbar’ by 
committing a crime and thereby accepting that others have the right 
to treat him the same way as he treated others. In Kantian terms, 
all humans have a rational part, what he calls ‘homo noumenon’, 
and it is this pure reason in us that ‘draw(s) up a penal law against 
myself as a criminal’.34 It is, in other words, the universality of 
reason that makes it rational and right to treat the offender accord-
ing to the ‘rules’ that his rational part drew up. Kant goes further 
and claims that this not only gives us the right to punish criminals, 
but that we have a duty to do so. However, we do not have to fol-
low Kant in this controversial last part of his argument, if we, like 
Andenæs and Rawls, set forth other reasons why we should carry 
out the punishment of somebody. The offender’s ‘Strafbarkeit’ – 
his deserving of punishment – becomes the minimum criterion 
that gives us the right to punish him, while crime prevention and 
other greater goods offer the reasons for actually going through 
with it. In either case, whether one accepts utilitarian reasons for 
punishment, or if one, like Kant, accepts only the moral imperative 
of retribution, punishment must be considered to realise the func-
tion of creating justice.
32 Op. cit.
33 John Rawls, ‘Two Concepts of Rules’, The Philosophical Review, 64 (1955).
34 Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals [1797] (Cambridge University Press, 
1996), p. 108.
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In the rule of law-tradition, or Rechtsstaat-tradition35, certain 
criteria must be met for punishment to be just. The debate about 
these criteria is extensive, and it would take us too far to account 
for the different positions here.36 There is, however, broad agree-
ment on three main criteria for just punishment. Firstly, the rules 
under which one is punished must be known in advance; there 
must be legal certainty so as to make it possible to make rational 
choices to uphold the law and avoid punishment. Secondly, there 
must be equality before the law; similar acts deserve similar reac-
tions, regardless of who committed them. And thirdly, there must 
be proportionality; the punishment must be balanced with the 
seriousness of the crime. Within the scale of punishment, more 
serious crimes should be punished more harshly than less serious 
crimes. If one or more of these criteria are not met – if one is either 
convicted without having been given a fair chance to avoid it by 
being made aware of the criteria for conviction in advance, if the 
punishment is unfair in the sense that there are no relevant reasons 
for the unequal treatment, or if the punishment does not stand in a 
reasonable relation to the offence committed – we would consider 
the sanction unjust and not in accordance with the rule of law.
How then, does restorative justice relate to these three criteria?
With regard to (1) legal certainty, it is clear that restorative jus-
tice does not entirely achieve it. The result of the meeting between 
the parties is not predetermined in a set of rules, so it is nearly 
impossible to know the sanction in advance. Neither are the crite-
ria for initiating a restorative justice process certain. A restorative 
justice meeting can in theory be initiated even when it is unclear 
whether a crime has actually been committed, whether one of the 
parties is criminally liable, if they both are, etc. However, when 
restorative justice is applied in a criminal context, there is usually 
more certainty. The process is initiated at the request of the police 
or prosecutor (and in some countries by a judge). It must be clear 
that the law has been transgressed and that the offender has taken 
responsibility for the act (though not necessarily legal responsibil-
ity) and agrees to be part of the restorative justice meeting.
35 See footnote 2, Chapter 1.
36 For a discussion of the rule of law principles forming the basis of the criminal 
law, see for instance Jørn Jacobsen, Fragment til forståing av den rettsstatlege straf-
feretten (Bergen: Fagbokforlaget, 2009).
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With regard to (2) equality restorative justice agreements vary 
to a large degree and acts that would be considered similar in the 
criminal process might result in completely different sanctions 
in a restorative justice process, depending, for instance, on the 
victim’s willingness to forgive. Restorative justice is therefore not 
in accordance with the principle of equality. As a note to this, we 
could add that restorative justice is in this sense similar to the civil 
part of the legal system – actions that one person might get sued 
for are left unsanctioned in other instances, because the possible 
plaintiff for some reason does not want a lawsuit. We do not hear 
many complaints about the unfairness of that system, something 
that suggests that the incomparability of restorative justice sanc-
tions may not be as problematic if considered outside of a criminal 
law context.
With regard to (3)  proportionality restorative justice does not 
include any rules determining the proportionality of the offence 
and the sanction. The criticism of restorative justice is usually that 
the sanctions are too mild – the offenders do not get what they 
deserve. It is true that the sanctions agreed upon – for example 
making some sort of fi nancial restitution – are from an outsider’s 
perspective often considerably less painful for the offender than 
the result would have been after a criminal process. The focus 
is primarily on remedying the harm done to the victim, and it 
is therefore usually less punitive toward the offender. However, 
one should not underestimate the emotional toll it takes on the 
offender having to face the victim and their family and hearing 
their suffering. Many offenders would probably prefer the seclu-
sion of a prison cell to the confrontation of a restorative justice 
meeting. The restorative justice process itself, and not just the 
result of the meeting, should therefore be viewed as an important 
part of the sanction. None the less, although the differences in the 
burden of the sanctions between the two types of processes might 
be slightly smaller than assumed, restorative justice cannot be said 
to fulfi l the criterion of proportionality.37
37 Restorative justice sanctions are problematic regardless of whether the criterion 
of proportionality is viewed as absolute or relative. Kant (The Metaphysics of 
Morals, pp. 105–06), for instance, operates with an absolute criterion of pro-
portionality, where each sanction must be balanced against the specifi c crime. 
Jareborg (Straffrättsideologiska, p. 148) and other modern criminal law theorists 
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The conclusion is that restorative justice does not live up to the 
standard of just sanctioning expressed through these three criteria, 
legal certainty, equality and proportionality. Restorative justice 
is in other words in confl ict with principles that are central to a 
traditional understanding of a criminal justice system based on the 
rule of law, or the democratic Rechtsstaat. This may be one of the 
main reasons why restorative justice processes, in all the countries 
in which they are applied, have usually been limited to less serious 
offences.38 The confl ict between the different conceptions of just 
sanctioning would become all too evident if, let us say, a murderer 
would come to a fi nancial agreement with the victim’s family, and 
the fulfi lment of the agreement were the only sanction he would 
suffer. The discrepancy between the solutions of the retributive and 
the restorative forms of justice becomes larger in more serious cases.
2.5 The underlying concepts of justice
Although the two types of processes share the aim of creating justice 
in individual cases, the content of the aim, as we have seen, is not the 
same. The concepts of justice that the processes seek to fulfi l differ 
from each other both substantially – with regard to what is seen as 
just, and formally – with regard to how justice is determined.
The concept of justice that the criminal process aims at fulfi lling 
is objective. It is objective in the sense that it can be expressed in the 
form of principles such as ‘crime ought to be punished’ and ‘pun-
ishment should be proportional to the crime’. These principles are 
expressed in advance, and the individual cases should deduce their 
see proportionality as relative within the scale of punishment, meaning that 
more blameworthy crimes ought to be punished more severely than less blame-
worthy crimes, and equally blameworthy acts should be punished equally. The 
principle of proportionality does not, according to this view, determine the 
level of repression itself. Even such a criterion of relative proportionality is 
unattainable for restorative justice, as there is no way of determining that more 
blameworthy crimes receive more severe sanctions, nor that equally blamewor-
thy crimes are sanctioned correspondingly.
38 There are some examples of restorative justice processes being applied in such 
serious cases as murder, child abuse and robbery, but then as an addition to, and 
not a replacement of the criminal process. See Tickell and Akester, Restorative 
Justice, p. 60.
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solutions from them so that they exemplify these principles. The 
concept of justice is thus also universal, applicable to all cases unless 
there are signifi cant reasons for making an exception. The criteria 
of legal certainty, equality and proportionality all contribute to 
realising this concept of justice.
The concept of justice that the restorative justice process aims at 
fulfi lling is, on the contrary, not universal. All confl icts are attempt-
ed to be resolved in their own, unique way, considering only factors 
that are directly relevant to the specifi c case. One does not try to 
solve a case similarly to other cases that resemble it. What is just 
in one case may be unjust in another. This is a singular, and not a 
universal concept of justice.
Naturally, the criminal process usually also leaves some room for 
considerations of factors that are unique to a case. The offender’s 
life situation, for instance, may be given attention when deliberat-
ing on the equity of the sanction. Nevertheless, the criminal process 
takes as its starting point the transgression of a certain prohibition. 
Otherwise dissimilar events are thus necessarily framed within the 
context of the crime in question. A certain likeness is abstracted 
from the cases in order to subsume them under the prohibition, 
and a certain set of justice criteria are assigned to them, such as 
the upper and lower limits of punishment for the type of crime. 
Restorative justice, on the other hand, is not committed to framing 
the confl ict within the context of a certain type of crime, and thus 
avoids having to relate the justice of the case to the general criteria 
of justice pertaining to that type of crime.39
Restorative justice also does not have an objective concept of 
justice. The just solution is not based on principles that are estab-
lished in advance (at least not explicitly). Instead the just solution 
is simply that which is considered just by the involved parties. I 
suggest we call this an inter-subjective concept of justice, as opposed 
to an objective one. If the parties come to an agreement that they 
39 The extent to which restorative justice processes, when applied in a criminal 
justice system, should be framed within the categories of the criminal law 
is a matter of debate. Some theorists, like RA Duff, propose that criminal 
mediation ought to be conducted “under the aegis of the criminal law” (op.
cit., p. 183), including defi ning the type of crime in question. Others, like Nils 
Christie, propose a strict separation between the two types of process, leaving 
the defi nition of the act in question up to the parties.
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consider to be just, then it does not matter whether it is in accor-
dance with the principle of proportionality or other such principles 
or not – justice is simply what the parties experience as justice in 
the particular case.
In this experience of justice, the emotions of the parties are an 
important component; an agreement is just when it feels right for 
the parties. If the agreement enables the parties to move on, if they 
leave with a feeling of justice having been done, if the process has 
helped them to deal with their trauma and concerns for the future 
– then the objective rationality of the content of the agreement 
becomes subordinate.
Moral philosophy has traditionally concentrated on clarifying 
moral concepts, such as the concept of justice. This is the Socratic 
legacy of Western philosophy: philosophy’s main task is to clarify 
concepts, and this will in turn lead us to act in the right way. As a 
result, the view of morals in Western philosophy has mainly been 
that they are a purely cognitive faculty – Kant being the epitome of 
this position, Aristotle being an important exception. Less empha-
sis has been laid on empathy, on moral impulse and intuition, on 
not just knowing intellectually what the right thing to do is, but 
feeling it and reacting on a moral emotion.
The moral philosophy of Emmanuel Lévinas is an expression of 
this latter position.40 For him, morality is something that occurs 
in the meeting between two people, a meeting of I and the Other. 
When I meet ‘the face of the Other’ an infi nite responsibility for 
this unique Other arises in me. It is not a reciprocal responsibil-
ity, like in a contract. Morality is not about treating everybody 
the same. On the contrary, Lévinas’ understanding of morality is 
about treating everybody as other, as unique. It is about acting on 
the moral experience of the concrete situation, not about reasoning 
about concepts and principles from which moral action is deduced.
This understanding of morality may better explain the way in 
which the experience of justice is conceived in restorative justice 
than the more cognitive and deductive moral reasoning that under-
lies the concept of justice that the criminal process aims at reaching. 
More emphasis is laid on the parties’ emotions, of restoring their 
40 Emmanuel Lévinas, Totality and Infi nity (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 
1969).
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sense of self-respect and feeling of safety, on establishing a feeling 
of closure and dealing with their emotional pain. Much attention 
is therefore devoted to ensuring that the process itself is conducted 
in a way that is conducive to these experiences. If the parties really 
are to feel that justice has been done, it is imperative that their 
autonomy is respected in the decision-making. Legal representa-
tion and jargon are avoided, less attention is devoted to fact-fi nding 
and establishing guilt, the rhetoric aims less at convincing a third 
party that one party is right and the other party is wrong, and more 
at fi nding a common future ground and repairing the relationship 
between the parties.41 The restorative justice meeting itself must be 
viewed as part of the experience of justice-being-done, and not just 
as a necessary step towards a just result.
These differences should not, however, be exaggerated. Restorative 
justice is not all about ‘listening to your inner feelings’ without 
any logical reasoning, and likewise, the criminal process is not a 
completely rational enterprise, where feelings are excluded entirely. 
In fact, this strict separation of feeling and reasoning is itself some-
what philosophically outdated.42 There is usually an element of the 
cognitive in the emotional, and the emotional in the cognitive.
The way I interpret Flemming Balvig’s survey, it supports the 
conclusion that these two elements are present to a varying degree 
in our deliberations on justice. On the most general level, our 
search for justice is mostly cognitive. We reason from principles 
such as that of proportionality. As we delve deeper into the con-
crete moral situation of punishing an offender, our moral intuition 
becomes more important. Perhaps it is a sense of empathy with the 
offender that makes the people in Balvig’s study less punitive as 
they get closer to the offender. In any case, the survey has shown 
that our sense of justice is complex and often incoherent – we dis-
play attitudes that contradict each other, depending on the context 
in which we are asked.
Perhaps then, it would be wise to conclude that although the 
justice of restorative justice is different from the justice of the 
criminal justice system, and there are considerable challenges in 
41 For a treatment of this ‘rhetoric of reconciliation’, see Trygve T. Svensson and 
David C. Vogt, ‘Konfl iktløsningens retorikk,’ Rhetorica Scandinavica, 52 (2010).
42 See for instance Antonio Damasio, Descartes’ Error (London: Vintage Books, 1994).
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incorporating the former into the latter, this need not be viewed 
primarily as a problem. Restorative justice could be welcomed as a 
supplement to the objective and universal criminal justice, because 
the complexity of our sense of justice cannot be exhausted by one 
such concept alone. If we acknowledge that our sense of justice is 
incoherent – if we acknowledge the impossibility of capturing all 
that we consider to be just within one universal concept – then the 
task of creating a completely coherent system of norms may appear 
less crucial. The prospect of different processes undermining each 
other within the system may seem less precarious.
As mentioned at the beginning, the life of the law is seldom con-
ducted strictly in accordance with one set of overarching principles. 
Perhaps we ought to see this as a strength and not a weakness of a 
justice system that ought to refl ect the citizens’ sense of justice. It 
might be a good thing if our focus shifted slightly in favour of put-
ting the solution of the individual confl ict fi rst – including applying 
the best suited form of process – even if it means accepting some 
differences in how similar cases are treated. Justice, after all, is not 
just about equal treatment, but about addressing the issues of the 
specifi c case, seeking, in the best possible way, to restore a sense of 
peace for the people involved.
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